This paper presents an analytical framework that can be used to analyze the effects of unions on productivity in the public sector. Our initial focus is on public libraries because considerable effort has been devoted to conceptualizing library productivity measures and because of the availability of data to implement the framework. Preliminary estimates are presented based upon data from 71 municipal libraries in Massachusetts.
I.

Introduction
Research by economists on the economic effects of unions in the private sector has tended to focus on unions' effects on their members' The traditional neoclassical view of unions asserts that although unions may benefit their members, by creating noncompensating wage differentials they cause allocative efficiency losses. Hence, their net impact on the economy as a whole is thought to be negative.4 Recently, however, this view has been challenged by Richard Freeman, James Nedoff, and their associates at Harvard.5 Drawing on hypotheses put forth long ago by institutional economists, they argue that unions may well increase productivity. Such increases may occur through a number of routes including union induced reductions in turnover, increases in morale and motivation, and increases in formal and informal on-the-job training. Indeed, several of their econometric studies suggest that union/nonunion productivity differentials in the private sector are often positive.6 To the extent that these results are generalizable, one must become much more agnostic on the question of whether unions in the private sector have had net adverse efficiency effects.
Research on the effects of unions in the public sector has paralleled the private sector studies. Numerous studies have sought to ascertain the 4 See, for example, Albert Rees, The Economics of Work and Pay, 2nd ed.
(New York, Harper and Row, 1979) , Chapter 10, for a summary of the neoclassical view, which does not necessarily represent his personal view.
5A good nontechnical treatment of their views is found in Richard Freeman and James Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest (Fall 1979) . 6See, for example, Charles Brown and James Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Production Process," Journal of Political Econy (June 1978), for evidence for U.S. manufacturing; Kim Clark, "Unions and Productivity in the Cement Industry" (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation, 1978) and his "The Impact of Unionization on Productivity: A Case Study," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July 1980), for evidence for the cement industry, and Steven Allen, "Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive?" (mimeograph, 1979) , for evidence for the U.S. construction industry. Lest one conclude that unions always increase productivity, the evidence available for coal mining in the U.S. suggests this is not true. See Marie Connerton, Richard Freeman, and James Medoff, "Productivity and Industrial Relations: The Case of U.S. Bituminous Coal" (mimeo, 1979) . effect of public sector unions on the relative wages of teachers, police, firefighters and other categories of municipal employees.7 Recent studies have moved beyond wage effects and analyzed the effects of public sector unions on nonwage employee benefits and on the trade-off between wages and retirement system characteristics. 8 In contrast to the private sector research, however, no research has been directed towards ascertaining the effects of unions on productivity in the public sector. This fact is not completely surprising; the concepts of output and productivity in the public sector are often not well-defined and the difficulties inherent in trying to measure productivity are consequently large. Nevertheless, the growing financial problems of state and local governments suggest that this important problem cannot be ignored. Prior studies of public sector wage determination have indicated, on average, that unions have tended to have only modest effects on their members' compensation; studies of public employee unions' effects on productivity are required to complete our understanding of the effects these unions have had on municipal finances and service flows. (mimeo, 1979) . This paper represents our initial efforts at analyzing the effects of unions on productivity in the public sector. We first sketch an analytical framework that can be used to estimate these effects, focusing for expository purposes on municipal public libraries. We initially focus on libraries because considerable effort has been devoted to conceptualizing productivity measures for them and because of the availability of data to implement the 9 framework.
After discussing the analytical framework, we present preliminary estimates of the effects of unions on productivity in public libraries based upon analyses of data from 71 municipal libraries in Massachusetts. We conclude by indicating how these analyses will be extended and the direction that we hope our future research will take.
II. A Simply Analytic Framework
Municipal libraries produce a variety of outputs which include, but are not limited to, the circulation of books, periodicals, and other audiovisual materials, responding to information and inter-library loan requests, and providing reference facilities. These outputs can in theory be evaluated in both quantitative and qualitative ways. While one can simply count circulation figures or the number of information requests, more sophisticated valuations of library output would focus on questions like "What proportion of information requests were answered correctly?" or "How long did the typical borrower have to wait for a book that he or she wanted?" For now we shall ignore the fact that libraries can be thought of as multiple product firms and also ignore the quality dimension of the services they provide. Instead, we assume that we can treat library output (Q) as being a 9For prior discussions of library productivity, see Malcolm Getz, Public Libraries: An Economic View (Johns Hopkins Press, 1980) 
Here P is the "price" the community must pay for a unit of library services, other things equal the higher the price the less library services will be demanded.
The position of the demand curve will depend upon community income or wealth, with higher income areas demanding more library services and it will also obviously depend upon the size of the community (V1).
Finally, the demand curve will depend upon the community's "taste" for library services (V2). For example, more highly educated communities may demand more library services, as may communities with a large proportion of school-age children.
The second element of our model is a production function for library services (2) Q = F(K,L!V3,U)
Here we have treated output, capital (K) and labor (L) as single variables.
The capital stock includes the library's entire stock of materials as of the current period. V3 is a vector which represents those community vanables that affect the position or shape of the production function. For example, one early study found that two-thirds to three-quarters of all library users lived within one mile of a library.10 This suggests that '°Bernard Berelson, The Library is Public (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949) .
increases in population density, which make it easier to locate branch libraries within a mile of all individuals, would increase the output of library services, ceteris paribus.
The production function of library services may also be a function of whether the library's employees are represented by a union. As noted by
Freeman and Medoff, unionization may well increase productivity through routes including union induced reductions in turnover, increases in morale and motivation, and increases in formal and informal on-the-job training.11
On the other hand, unionization of library employees may well reduce productivity if it places limits on library management's ability to substitute factors of production or if it requires library management to devote more resources to the contract negotiation process and to the resolution of grievances.12 Of key concern to us is what the net effect of unions on the production function is.
The stock of capital that a library has depends upon its stock of capital in the preceeding period (K1), its investment in new capital (I), and the rate at which its previous stock of capital depreciates (6). The latter depends upon the age distribution of the library's books (in the main books are used most heavily in the initial years following their purchase) and the resources that the library devotes to maintaining its collection and avoiding theft. We shall ignore the latter two considerations here and treat the depreciation rate as a constant.
11Freeman and Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest, Fall 1979. '2See, for example, Marilyn Oberg, Mary Blackburn, and Joan Dible, "Unionization Costs and Benefits to the Individual and to the Library," in Margaret Chaplan, ed., Employee Organizations and Collective Bargaining in Libraries, Library Trends, 25, October 1976, and Milton Byran, "Implications for Public Libraries" in Frederick Schlipf, ed., Collective Bargaining in Libraries (Urbana, Illinois, 1975) .
(3)
The costs incurred by a library are primarily for labor, for new acquisjjo, and for maintaining the library's collection and buildings.
Let W be the cost per unit of labor, m the per unit cost of maintaining the collection and C the user cost of new materials. Then the total costs the library incurs is given by
C=wL+CI+
For later reference, remember that a primary goal of unions is to increase their members' wages. To the extent that they are successful, W will be an increasing function of U.
The cost function for library services is obtained by minimizing (4), subject to (2) and (3). From this, one can obtain the average cost function for library services.
(5) AC = AC(QIW,C,m,v,oKFU)
If the underlying library production function exhibits constant (decreasing) (increasing) returns to scale, average cost will be constant (increase with output) (decrease with output).
We have plotted the demand curve and average cost curve for library services in Figure 1 ; the latter under the assumption of constant average costs. The average cost curve represents the price to the library of producing different levels of library services. Given the demand curve, D, Q* units of library services will be demanded and produced. At this level of library services, library revenues just cover its costs. Obviously, anything that shifts the demand curve up will increase output while anything that shifts the average cost curve up will reduce it. The key point to note is that observed output is determined by both demand and cost factors.
Price of
The effects of unions on service flows operate both via their effects on wages and their effects on the production function (2). If unions do increase the wages of library employees this would shift the average cost curve up and reduce output. If unions increase (decrease) the level of output associated with any given input levels (for the reasons discussed earlier) this will shift the average cost curve down (up), thereby increasing (decreasing) output.
Equation (6) 
III. Extensions of the Framework
The simple framework sketched above may be inadequate for a number of reasons. First, the wage of library employees is endogenous, in the sense that it will be determined both by whether the library employees are unionized and the forces that affect the demand for library services, as well as other variables (V4).13 As such, if one were to specify a wage determination equation of the form
it is likely that tne error term in this equation would be correlated with the error term in (6). This might happen, for example, if data on some variable that affected the demand for library services was unavailable and omitted from both equations (6) and (7). If correlated error terms occurred, biased estimates of (6) would result if it was estimated by ordinary least squares.
Second, the extent of unionization, as measured by whether a library's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement is also likely to be endogenously determined. It is not unreasonable to expect that collective bargaining coverage will be a function both of state laws governing public employee unionization, and the proportions of public and private employees in a state that are union members. The size of the library is also likely to matter;
large libraries may be more bureaucratic in nature and more conducive to 14 unionization. Finally, collective bargaining coverage is likely to be 13For a discussion of the variables that influence public sector wage determination, see Ehrenberg and Goldstein, .2P• cit.
14Theodore Guyton, Unionization: The Viewpoint of Librarians (Chicago, 1975) .
related to both the estimated wage premium associated with collective bargaining and the estimated productivity differential associated with collective bargaining; the former because it influences both employees demand for collective bargaining coverage and library management's resistance to it, the latter because the productivity effects associated with collective bargaining also influence management's resistance to it. Third, the analyses described above focuses on the effect of unions on observed output; the latter is a determined by both demand and cost considerations. One might prefer instead to focus directly on the underlyLng production process for library services and ask questions like "Does the existence of unions alter library output per employee?", "Do unions affect the substitutability of capital for labor in the provision of library services?".
Or shifting to the case of multiple types of library employees (e.g., librarians, other professional employees, library aides, other clerical employees), "Do unions alter the Substitutability of different categories of library employees in the face of relative price changes?". Such generalizations would involve using a variant of the "production function" approach 15See Lung-Fei Lee, . cit., for the genesis of this approach.
used by Brown and Medoff, and Clark, and/or estimating the parameters of a production function from cost share data.
For example, if the production function for library service in equation
(2) can be written as The r are those variables that are expected to influence library output, either from the demand or cost sides of the model. The cost side is captured here by population density (r1); as noted earlier previous studies have suggested that increased population density reduces the cost of providing library services, and hence should increase library output. The demand side is represented by a set of variables expected to influence a community's preferences for library services; these include the percent of the population that is female (r7), the percent nonwhite (r3), the percents of the population that are older than age 18 (r4) and age 65 (r5) Several things should be noted about this specification. Data limitations in this initial study preclude a number of variables that appear in equation (6) from appearing in equation (10). The omitted variables include the wage rates of library employees, the lagged stock of library materials, and the rate at which library materials depreciate. The estimated coefficients which we report below should be considered very tentative then; they may well suffer from omitted variable bias. In particular, because library employees' wages were unavailable in this sample, the coefficient of the unionization variable will capture both the net effects of collective bargaining on the production function for library services and of union induced wage gains on average costs and hence output.
Our preLiminary estimates ol ejuation (10) appear in Table 1 . The populations of the mUILfpalltit:s in our sample varied from 10,000 to over 500 ,000 and to cont rH for heterscedasticity we have weighted each observation by the square root of its population, The employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement in approximately one-quarter of the libraries in the sample.
Turning first to the vector of variables other than unionization, many of these variables af LOLt Library output in a manner consistent with our a priori predictions. An increase in the school age population (decrease in r,) increases library usage as does an increase in the proportion of the population over age 65 (r.). An increase in the median education level of the population (r6) also leads La higher usage, as does an increase in the proportion of employees who are employed in the education industry (r10).
in contrast, neither of the variables that reflect the communities' capacity to pay (r7 and r8) are significantly related to library output.
While an increase in the proportion of the population that is female (r2) leads to an increase in the number of borrowers, a result that might be expected if females tend not to be in the labor force, an increase in the labor force participation rate of females (r9) is associated with higher circulation of library materials. Finally, an increase in population density (r1) leads to a reduction in library output and an increase in the proportion of the population that is nonwhite (r3) to higher output.'7 17Malcolm Getz, Public Libraries: An Economic View, finds a similar negative relationship between density and library output in his study of branch libraries in New York City. He argues that population density may be a proxy for the rental cost of structures, with more dense areas having higher rental rates. If this occurs, the average cost of library services may well be higher in denser areas which would lead, from Figure 1 , to a lower level of library services. Thus, a negative relationship between population density and library output may well be consistent with our model. The primary vnri:hie of interest to us, of course, is the unionization variable. These data suggest that libraries covered by a collective bargaining agreement have, ceteris parii:us, some 29.2 (exp( .256)-i) percent more borrowers per capita than do nonunion libraries. Both circulation and interlibrary loans per capita appear to be lower in unionized Libraries, however these effects are not significnntly different from zero. Because of these results, it is not Surprising t:hat on a per borrower basis, circulation and interlibrory loans are also lower in unionized libraries 18
How robust are these results to the estimation methods used? Row (1) of (2) and (3) show that estimates obtained when the method of ordinary least squares is used (row (2)) and when an additional variable, median age, is included to more fully control for the age distribution of the population (row (3)) are virtually identical.
As noted in Section ILl, however, all of these estimates may well be subject to selectivity bias. Using the method described in the appendix, 19 one can attempt to control for this problem.
First a reduced form probit equation is estimated that determines the probability that a library's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. From these equations, one can compute estimates of variables which are then added to the productivity equations to control for the probability that a library's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. These "augmented" 18Put another way, if an increase in a variable causes the log of X1 to increase but does not affect the log of X2, it is not surprising that the log of (X2/X1) falls.
19Actually, the method implemented here is simpler since it ignores library employees' wage rates.
productivity equations can then be estimated by ordinary least squares and consistent parameter estimates obtained; this is done separately for libraries that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement and those that are not. Finally, the estimated parameters and the mean values of the explanatory variables can be used to compute consistent estimates of the union/nonunion productivity differentials.
Estimates of the reduced form probit equation appear in Table 3 . The These estimates are then used, as described above, to obtain consistent estimates of the productivity equations and estimates of the Union/nonunion productivity differentials.21 These differentials are summarized in row (4) of We hope to get around all of these problems in future work. The ICMA has made the data tape, upon which their published report on municipal libraries was based, available to us. This tape provides fairly comprehensive data on all of the "library variables" needed to implement the various approaches discussed in Sections II and III for approximately 250 cities of population size 25,000 or greater. Socioeconomic characteristic variables for these cities can be obtained from the 1977 City and County
Databook. Finally, we have obtained data on the collective bargaining coverage of library employees in these cities by a mail survey; our response rate to this survey has been well over 90 percent.
Because these cities do not all lie in one state, it will be possible for us to better model the forces that affect the probability that library employees in a city are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
These include the extent of public and private unionization in a state, variables for which published data exists, as well as the laws governing public sector collective bargaining in a state. Our colleague John Burton has expended considerable effort to collect data on, and to parameterize, these laws and has generously made these data available to us. A substantially better specified probability of collective bargaining coverage equation should reduce the likelihood that our estimates of union productivity effects are subject to selectivity bias.
In addition to our more comprehensive analysis of the effect of unions on productivity in public libraries, we also plan to pursue the question of the routes via which unions influence productivity in the public sector.
Our initial focus in this aspect of the project will be on public education and we will make use of a unique set of longitudinal data on educational outcomes, school, district background variables, and union contract provisions that our colleague Sam Bacharach has constructed for local school districts in New York State. Our analyses here will permit us to test for the effects of specific union contract pvisions on educational outcomes, rather than for the effects of collective bargaining coverage per se. The longitudinal nature of the data will permit the application of econometric methods that allow one to control for omitted variables that otherwise might bias the analyses.22 That is, these methods substantially reduce the likelihood that the estimates that result will be subject to selectivity bias because omitted variables that affect the probability of collective bargaining coverage or contract provisions may also affect educational outcomes.
22For details, see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "Unions and Productivity in the Public Sector" (proposal submitted to the National Science Foundation, March 1980). In general, it is not possible to observe both Q . and Q ., or W . and Ui fli Ui W with cross-section data, as at a point in time either a library's employees are covered by an agreement or they are not. A naive approach that circumvents this problem is to estimate wage and output equations separately for employees in cities with and without agreements, use the estimated coefficients from these regressions and the characteristics of a city to compute predicted values of the wage and library output that would be observed in both sectors, and then estimate the differentials by calculating the percentage difference in these predicted values.
A2
More formally, suppose that we postulate that the wage rate library employees would receive in a city if they are unionized is a log linear function of a vector of variables, X, which represent all of the variables that would appear in equation (7) in the text, plus a random error term The naive approach would involve estimating the parameters of (A2) and (A4) by ordinary least squares from observations on libraries whose employees were unionized and the parameters of (A3) and (A5) by ordinary least squares A3 from observations on libraries whose employees were not organized. Given estimates of these parameters (si. , a. , . , . ) and the relevant characju jn ju jn teristics of a representative city (X.., Y..), one can then obtain estimates of the relative output and wage differentials from This occurs because libraries are not randomly assigned to collective bargain-.
ing status, but rather employees and library management make explicit choices on the matter. Estimates of the wage and output equations that ignore the underlying choice model will be biased because they will confound the effect of an explanatory variable on wages and output with its effect on the probability that the library's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. To correct for this sample selectivity problem requires us to model the underlying economic choice process that determines whether a library's employees are unionized. This problem is complicated by the fact that such an event is a product of both employee and employer decisions.
To keep our estimation problem manageable, we assume that the choice process that determines whether a library's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement can be approximated by Here S. is an unobserved variable that represents the likelihood that a municipal library will be unionized, v. is a random error term, and the Z are all of the variables expected to influence the probability of observing a collective bargaining agreement, other than dqj and d.. The parameter is assumed to be greater than zero, as positive output effects resulting from collective bargaining should reduce employers' opposition to collective bargaining. The sign of is indeterminate, however, as positive union! nonunion wage differentials will increase library employees' demand for collective bargaining, but also increase municipal employers' attempts to resist unionization. Although S. is not observed, we can arbitrarily scale its cut-off value to be zero, so that if S. is greater than zero, the library's employees will be covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U. = 1). Similarly, if the index is less than or equal to zero, the employees would not be covered by an agreement (U. 0).
Consistent estimates of the model specified in (Al) through (A7) can be obtained using an iterative procedure originally suggested by Lung-fei Lee.
One can substitute the wage and output equations (A2) to (A5) into 
